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DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
FOR THE NORTH LATAM COUNTY
I-IIGHWAY DISTRICT; ORLAND
ARNEBERG, RICHARD HANSEN,
SHERMAN CLYDE, in their official
capacities and in their individual capacities;
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capacity and in his individual capacity,
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District for Latah County.
Honorable Carl Kerrick, District Judge.
Don and Charlotte Halvorson, pro se
1290 American Ridge Road, Kendrick. Idaho, 83537, for PlaintiffsIAppellant
Ronald Landeck, attorney
Moscow, Idaho, for RespondentsIDefet~dants
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs filed notice of appeal on 611912009 of the District Court's 511 112009 granting of
cross suinmary judgment in favor of Defendants on all elements of Plaintiffs' complaint.
Plaintiffs appeal the District Court's final judgment of granting suinmary judgment and attorney
fees and costs of $78,678.50 to the Defendants and of de~lyingpartial summary judgment to
Plaintiffs under 42 USC

5

1983 (I~ereafter§ 1983) for the liability of Defendants for the

deprivation of Plaintiffs' property rights and violations of Plaintiffs' due process (procedural and
substantive) and equal protection of the law rights. At cross summary judglnent Defendants
asserted that they had conducted all their activities on Camps Canyon Road (hereafter CCR), a
public highway, established by user, within a minimum 50 foot width mandated by Idaho law (R,
Vol. VII, p. 1429, par. 1). Plaintiffs disputed all of Defendants jurisdictio~lal"facts" as the
agency record evidenced no governmental action to have legally established Defendants' claims;
and asserted Defendants Ilad no immunity for their constitutional and statutory violations.
The undisputed material facts of this case include the following. Plaintiffs obtained deed
to all the lands in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM, with the exception of the 3+1- acre
parcel', recorded under instrument No. 42441 1 (R., Vol. IV, p. 670-71), Latah County, Idaho in
December of 1996. Plaintiffs' deed cites a county and public road with the road forming the NE

'

The 3+/- acre parcel was purchased by Eli Harris, predecessor in the land to the Wagners froin
Per and Anna Johanson, predecessors in the land to the Plaintiffs in 1911 for all intents and
purposes for a driveway access to CCR (R, Vol. VI, p. 1152). The historic Harris driveway
followed the south property line of the 3+/- acre parcel then turned north along the east property
line to access CCR. Although CCR crossed the Harris farm the crossing was beyond the breaks
of the canyon. The 3+/- acre parcel accorded Harris a ridge top access to CCR. No one lived on
the Harris farm after the 1960's.
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boundary between the. 3+/- acre parcel and Plaintiffs' land (R, Vol. IV, p. 671 (deed description);
R., Vol. VI, pp. 1155-1 156 (survey and an~endedsurvey)). No survey was recorded with the
purchase of the 3+1- acre parcel in 1911 (R., Vol. V, p. 1152 (Latah County Instrument No.
57421)). CCR in the SENE Section 15 has never been laid out and recorded by orders of the
commissioners of the NLCI-ID (R. Vol. V, pp. 883-84, (Chairman Arneberg's response to
Request for Admission No. 2-Chairman

Arneberg does not know if CCR has ever been laid out

and recorded)). CCR remained stable from its earliest beginnings until the fall of 1996 (R, Vol.
V, pp.797-798, Interrogatory No. 6 (no changes were noted until beginning in 1996)). In 1996
alterations were made to the location and width of CCR (R., Vol. V, pp. 867-68, Defendant
Ameherg's Response to Plaintiffs' Intetl-ogatories 16 (Defendant Arneberg responds to what he
told Mr. Wagner of the 1996 alterations); R., Vol. V., p. 786, Defendant Arneberg's response to
Request for Ad~nissionNo. 3, subpart c. (Defendant Arneberg admits that the physical location
of CCR was altered in 1996); R., Vol. V, pp. 803-04 Request for Admission Nos. 42, and 43
(Defendant Payne admits that the centerline and width of CCR were altered in 1996); R., Vol.
VII, pp. 1401-02, (Ed Swanson speaks of the 1996 alteration to CCR and affirms he gave
permission for the alteration in the "surface of the roadway")). After the 1996 alteration CCR
remained stable until the fall of 2005 when the activities of this dispute began. CCR has had no
official dedication to the public (R, Vol. IV, p. 642, L. 10-12, par. ?(No deed had been recorded
for CCR); Tr., Vol. I, p. 126, L. 17 through p. 127, L. 6 (there is no such recorded instrument)).
In the latter part of 2005 neighbors to Plaintiffs' property, the Wagners, sought to reestablish the old 31.1- acre parcel driveway and Mr. Wagner called Plaintiffs to confirm his
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proposed driveway and access to CCR. Plaintiffs met with and explained to the Wagners that the
llistoric driveway followed the east property line marked by the farm line which was 40 feet to
the west their proposed access; even though there was an 8' embankment where the east property
line intersected CCR. Plaintiffs told the Wagners that the NLCHD had altered the road in 1996
(R., Vol. VI, pp. 1351-52, par. 9).
A short time later, in the late fall of 2005, the NLCHD began again to alter the "surface
of the roadway2" and without notice (R, Vol. V, p. 858, L. 1-4, Interrogatory No. 26) the
NLCHD pushed 6 inches of gravel into Plaintiffs' buffer3 (R, Vol. 11, p. 407, L. 1-5, par. 2). On
or about 4/8/06 Plaintiffs discovered that the Wagners had constructed their driveway across the
east property line to an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land. On 4/10/06 Plaintiff, Don Halvorson,
called Defendant Dan Payne, NLCHD foreman, and informed him that the driveway access was
wholly on Plaintiffs' land and asked Mr. Payne if he had issued a permit (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1352,
pars. 10 and 11) (R, Vol. VII, p. 1429, L. 13-23, par. 3). Mr. Payne said that he had.

2 ~help
o eliminate obfuscation, Plaintiffs will use the District Court's definitions. The
definitions of "right of way", "surface of the roadway", and "statutory authority" are as the
District Court defines them. R, Vol. VII, p. 1462, L. 15-19) ("Thus, statutory authority
establishes that fifty feet is the minimum width of a public highway in Idaho. This lnini~iium
width encompasses the surface area of the roadway, as well as the area that is comlnonly referred
to as the right of way. The right of way is that area of undeveloped land next to the highway
which is necessary for the proper upkeep and repair of the road"). Thus, "Surface of the
roadway" + "right of way"="Statutory authority".
Plaintiffs' buffer was the undeveloped area between the edge of the "surface of the roadway"
and Plaintiffs' fence left when Plaintiffs rebuilt the fence to the NE of CCR in 1997 after the
1996 alteration to CCR to avoid interference with snow storage in the winter with Plaintiffs'
fence.
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Procedurally, Plaintiffs began to try to resolve the problems. On 4/12/06 Don IHalvorson
attended the regular meeting of the NLCHD Commissioners and found that the Wagners were
also in attendance (R., Vol. V, pp. 864-866 Defendant Arneberg's Response to Interrogatories
No. 12 (Defendant Arneberg explains the circumstances of the 4112106 NLCHD meeting)).
Plaintiff Don Halvorson told the Commissioners that the first Wagner driveway access permit
was issued for an access wholly on Plaintiffs' land and that the NLCHD had no "right of way" or
authority to widen the road or issue the permit (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1352-1355, par. 13). The
Commissioners said there was a public road so therefore they had prescriptive rights to a 50foot-25-feet

fi-om centerline right of way and that right of way justified Defendants' issuance of

the permit (R, Vol. V, p. 854, L. 13-22, Interrogatory No. 18). Plaintiffs rebutted the
Commissioners' claims stating that there was no deed of record for a "right of way" for CCR in
the Latah County records and that their easement was limited to the width ofthe road. Plaintiff
asked the Commissioners to call for a survey, ie. to join the Wagners in a survey to resolve the
situation (R, Vol. V, p.842, L. 14-16). Con~missionersrefused to call for a survey or to have the
Wagners obtain a professional survey. Plaintiff stated he would call for a survey (R, Vol. VI, pp.
1348-1358). In early June 2006 Rimrock Consultants set the stakes for their survey, revealing
the first Wagner driveway access to be wholly on Plaintiffs land. The Wagners sought a second
permit and constructed a second driveway west of the east property line.
However, Plaintiffs' problems with the NLCIHD did not go away; they escalated.
Beginning in the summer of 2006, Defendants without notice (R, Vol. V, p. 858, Interrogatory
No. 27) started to add large amounts of dirt and gravel to the "surface of the roadway" and since
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the winter of 2007 the Defendants have piled snow on Plaintiffs' fence and continued to impact
Plaintiffs' buffer and fence with additions of rock and gravel throughout 2008 and 2009 resulting
in significant injuries and repairs to Plaintiffs' fence (Tr. Vol. I, p. 46, L. 13-17; p. 47, L. 10-23).
The width of, the slope of, or the "surface of the roadway" of CCR is not 50 feet (R., Vol. IV, p.
638, par. 7 (after the 2006 additions of width the average width is 21 feet); nor do either the
Defendants or the District Court claim the "surface of the roadway" to be 50 feet (R., Vol. VII, p.
1460-63, par.2). Defendants added at least 6 to 8 feet of width in 200512006 (R., Vol. IV, p. 638,
par. 6; R., Vol. VI, p. 1210, par. 4 and 5) encroaching on Plaintiffs' buffer-the
left in 1997 between the road's edge and their fence-and

area Plaintiffs

damaging Plaintiffs' fence.

Beginning in the winter of 2006 and throughout 2007 Plaintiffs sought agency remedy of
the problems with the NLCHD concerning Defendants' jurisdiction, the legal establishment of
public rights in CCR, and Defendants' policies1custoins to widen the road, to issue driveway
access permits, to damage Plaintiffs' fence and to determine their claimed encroaclment of
Plaintiffs' fence, including seeking hearings (R, Vol. V, p. 816-817 (On 3121107 Plaintiffs sought
a post deprivation hearing trying to resolve the issues and were denied a meaningful informal or
formal hearing or resolution)). Plaintiffs requested that Defendants validate the easement under
their own resolution under I.C. 5 40-203a (R, Vol. V, p.806-814 (prior to the 3/21/07 meeting
Plaintiffs sent Defendants a letter requesting that the Commissioiiers validate CCR and bringing
evidence of the pernlission granting factors for them to do so)); hired a lawyer and sought an
informal meeting at CCR with Defendants and Plaintiffs' predecessor in the land, Ed Swanson
(R., Vol. V, p. 877-878, Defendant Hansen's response to Interrogatories Nos. 7, 8, and 9
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(Commissioner Hailsen acknowledges Plaintiffs' attempts to resolve the issues)). Plaintiffs
requested that Defendants evaluate their actions for possible due process violations under the
Idaho Regulatory Takings Act (IRTA) (R, Vol. V, p. 828-837). Defendants not only denied
Plaintiffs a meaningful predeprivational inquiry into the legal establishment of public rights in
the road, but also denied post deprivational renledy of exhaustion of agency remedies on the
grounds that the easement is a public road therefore it is 50 feet wide (R, Vol. V, p. 827
(Commissioner Hansen expresses his indifference to Plaintiffs' protected property rights"Richard Hansen said the property line issues have nothing to do with the highway district'and that there is "an existing road with a 50 foot prescriptive right of way"; p. 823, L. 20-33
(both Commissioners Hansen and Clyde express their disregard of the issues-there

is no reason

for them to initiate validation proceedings)). On 8/8/07 Plaintiffs presented a proposal for
settlement (R, Vol. V, p. 902-908) and the Colnmissioners refused to allow Plaintiffs to represent
themselves as Plaintiffs would not have the expense of an attorney (R, Vol. V, p. 839, I>.29-41).
Plaintiffs requested that the Defendants give them a declaratory ruling on the applicability of I.C.

5 40-203a (R, Vol. V, p. 826) and Defendants did not respond.
Plaintiffs they had two choices-pay

On 9115107 Defenda~tstold

$750 fee for a hearing to regain their land or to get a lawyer

(R, Vol. V, p. 819-823). On 11/6/07 Plaintiffs filed a tort claim notice (R, Vol. VII, p. 1429, L.
12, par. 2) and on 3/3/08 Plaintiffs filed for action under 42 USC 5 1983 for the wrongful taking
of their land and in the alternative tort, trespass, inverse condemnation and nuisance.
Procedurally, in District Court, Plaintiffs filed initial motions for declaratory judgments
under I.C. 5 67-8003(3) (R, Vol. I, p. 68-100) and under I.C. § 40-203a (R, Vol. I, p. 176-183) as
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Plaintiffs had sought agency remedies and were denied a response by the Defendants. These
requests for declaratory relief were denied; under I.C. 5 40-203a as "advisory" (R, Vol. 11, p.
255-256); and under both I.C. 5 67-8003(3) and I.C. 5 40-203a as a matter ofjudicial econoil~y
as the facts needed to be determined in the up coming litigation (R, Vol. 11, p. 258, L. 2-6).
Subsequently, Plaintiffs then filed three motions for partial summary judgments4 indicating to
the District Court that CCR had not been laid out and recorded by orders of the commissioners.
Therefore the width of the easement was limited to the "surface of the roadway"; that the burden
of proof of the legal establishment of public rights in CCR rested with the Defendants or the
Defendants needed to validate the legally established public rights in CCR; as they claimed CCR
was a public road and the location of CCR did not correspond to the location in the public record
of Plaintiffs' deed description and due to numerous alterations in CCR Defendants could no
longer accurately determine the legally established width and location of CCR; that Defendants'
policy/custom for widening a highway, presently existing at a lesser width than 50 feet, was
facially invalid as they had not legally established a "right of way" under I.C.§§ 40-605 andlor
1310 to widen the highway; and that Defendants' invasions of and permitting third parties

4~laintiffs
' Sepiember 19, 2008 Motion is the same as Plaintiffs Moiionfor Pa~tialSummary
Judgment/Adjudication of the Issue of the A~ullificationof the Original Prescriptive Right of Way
and Subsequent Burden of Proof of Prescription andor Validation ofihe Legally Established
Right of Way (R. Vol. 11, p. 3 13-321 (motion, brief and affidavit)); Plaintiffs ' Motionfor Partial
Summary .Judgment/Adjudication ofthe issue of the Facial Validity o f the NLCHD 's Standing
Operating Procedure/Policy/Custom of Widening a Prescriptive Right of Way is the same as
Plaintiffs ' October 6, 2008 Motion (R Vol. 11, p. 324-334 (motion and brief)); Plaint$fi' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment/Adjudication of the issue of the Cause For Action Under 42 USC
1983 is the same as Plaintiffs' OctoberZI, 2008 Motion (R. Vol. 11, pp. 387-409 (motion, brief
and affidavit).
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invasions of Plaintiffs' land and damages to Plaintiffs' fence were final decisions and
deprivations of Plaintiffs property rights and violations of Plaintiffs 14~''Amendnlent rights,
regardless of the final determination of acquisition by the users of the road as the Defendants had
enveloped of more of Plaintiffs' land since the late fall of 2005 and after. Plaintiffs asserted
that their right to due process was absolute. All Plaintiffs' interlocutory motions were denied on
the basis that the width of the easement needed to be factually determined (R, Vol. IV, pp. 766771 (Plaintiffs' motions for relief as a matter of law are denied as the width of the right of way of
CCR needed to be factually determined).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether Plaintiffs have propertyllibe~tyrights in the fee of the land, including the right to
peacefully enjoy their land, their fence, andlor to a jury trial to determine of all the facts
necessary to establish their

5 1983 case and/or to determine the location, width, and character of

the easement of CCR as it traverses their land covered by the 14"' Amendment.
2. Whether Defendants deprived Plaintiffs of their property rights when Defendants failed the
I.C.§40-202 requirement to show five years of public use and maintenance of the lands used to
widen the surface of CCR or to provide driveway access for the Wagners under their first permit
and/or when they increase the burden on Plaintiffs, the servient estate, by enveloping more land.
3. Whether Defendants denied Plaintiffs due process (procedural and substantive) and equal
protection of the law when they failed to acquire "right of way" under I.C.$§ 40-605 or 1310 or
eminent domain or condemnation proceedings, when they were given fair warning they had
issued the first Wagner driveway access permit for a trespass and failed to respond in a
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meaningful way, when they failed to give notice to Plaintiffs concerning the Defendants claims
that Plaintiffs' buffer andlor fence were encroaching , or when they failed to respond to
Plaintiffs' attempts to exhaust agency remedies.
4. Whether the District Court erred in granting Defendants summary judgment and attorney fees
and costs and in denying Plaintiffs declaratory relief, relief as a matter of law, leave to amend
their complaint, andlor in not sanctioning Defendants for spoliation of the evidence.
5. Whether Plaintiffs have, as a matter of right, a right to challenge Commissioners'IDefendants'
andlor the District Court's final decisions which substantially prejudice Plaintiffs' property and
14"' Amendment rights.

6. Whether CCR was legally established as a public highway.
7. Whether I.C.340-2312 adjudicates public rights to a 50 foot prescriptive "right of way".
8. Whether the identical strip of land for which Defendants claim prescriptive acquisition can be

accurately identified after Defendants' numerous unrecorded alterations.

9. Whether Defendants' affidavits were made in bad faith; or whether Defendants were
improperly augmenting the agency record with their affidavits.
10. Whether Defendants could lawfully issue a driveway access permit to a third party across
Plaintiffs' land; or repeatedly damage Plaintiffs' fence and add width to CCR with maintenance.

1 1. Whether Defendants' failures to allow exhaustion of remedies displayed callous disregard
and deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs' complaints of deprivation of their constitutional rights.
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12. Whether the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction to rule on Defendants' motion for
sunmary judgment when the District Court's ruling was not based on the agency record, when
Plaintiffs sought to exhaust agency remedies.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
Plaintiffs request attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 USC 3 1988, I.C. $ 5 12-121, 1 17,
and 40-2013 and costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40 as prevailing party on all issues in this appeal.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs appeal the District Court granting summary judgment and attorney fees and
costs to the Defendants and the denying of partial summary judgments to Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs
disputed Defendants' jurisdictional "facts" that CCR is "a public highway", "established by
user" and has "a minimum width of 50 feet mandated by Idaho law" (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 101-1 13; p.
146, beginning at L. 12 through p. 151, L. 10). As already previously stated in the statement of
this case, that at cross summary judgment the undisputed material facts show: (i) an easement,
CCR, exists across Plaintiffs' land; (ii) the "surface of the roadway" of CCR has undergone
alterations in its width and location in 1996 and again starting in 2005 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 121, L. 2224) (Tr. Vol. I, p. 125, L. 15-24); R, Vol. VII, p. 1432, L. 5-7 (Defendants' brief states that the
record does establish that CCR was widened in 1996 and 200512006 (emphasis placed by
Defendants); R, Vol. VI, p. 1210-1211, pars. 4 and 5 (Defendant Payne's affidavit describes
widening and that since the late fall of 2005 Defendants have added at least 6-8 feet of width to
the "surface of the roadway"), (iii) the first Wagner driveway access permit was issued for an
access wholly on Plaintiffs' land (Tr. Vol. I, p. 122, L. 20-25; p. 123, L. 1-4); (iv) no "right of
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way" has been laid out and recorded by orders of the corninissioners for CCR; (v) CCR has had
no official dedication to the public interest; (vi) Defendants have never given Plaintiffs notice of
encroachment or hearings on these issues; and procedurally (vii) Plaintiffs sought agency
remedies and were denied a meaningful response by Defendants. Further, factual disputes
continued as to: (i) the actual location and width of the acquisition of the users of the "surface of
the roadway" of CCR and (ii) the character of the easement of CCR; as the permission given by
the previous owner of Plaintiffs' land for the 1996 alterations was disputed by the Defendants.
These factual disputes were repeatedly pointed out by the District Court through its interlocutory
rulings (R., Vol. 11, pp. 251-259; R., Vol. 11, pp. 307-312; R., Vol. 11, pp. 763-774) that the width
of the easement needed to be factually determined. Plailltiffs assert that the undisputed and
disputed facts show that Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of their property rights covered by
the 5"' and 14"' Amendments of the US Constitution; as Defendants conducted their activities of
widening CCR and issuing the first Wagner driveway access permit into lands unencumbered by
any easement or part of the Defendants' legally established highway system. Furthermore, the
disputed facts, the accurate location and width and the character of the easement, are not fatal to
Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion on the Defendants liability for Plaintiffs' due
process and equal protection violation claims. The very presence of a protected property right is
sufficient to rise to the protection of the 1 4 ~Amendment.
"
The undisputed and disputed evidence
both show doubt of the legal establishment of public rights in CCR as Defendants claim; that due
to numerous alterations it can no longer be accurately located; and that its present location does
not agree with the public records. Furthern~ore,Defendants' activities under their policies are
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proscribed by law-the

issuance of a permit for a trespass andlor the wrongful conversion of

Plaintiffs' land to a private party, not for public use; and encroacl~menton Plaintiffs' land and
fence requires notice by law and Plaintiffs have a right of private action to seek agency remedy.
At cross summary judgment Defendants dropped their factual claim-the
width of CCR-and

prescriptive 50 foot

claimed the 50 foot width under statutory [I.C.§40-23 121 authority (Tr. Vol.

I, p. 1 14, starting at line 21 through p. 115, L. 22) with the caveats that the "surface of the
roadway" of CCR had been widened and was located approxiinately the same as it was in 1974.

Standard of Review: Plaintiffs assert that the District Court was acting in an appellate role in its
determination of the legal establishment of the public rights in CCR and the standard of review
must incorporate a review of the agency record as is found in I.C. 3 40-208; as such, this appeal
Plaintiffs have challenged Defendants' decisions,
would be a matter of right (see I.A.R. 11(0.
actions andlor failures to act in regards to Defendants' claims to have established public rights in
the easement which traverses their land under Idaho Code Title 40. See Homestead Farms, Inc.

v. B'rd of County Comm'rs of Teton County, 141 Idaho 855,858, 119 P.3d 630,633-634 (2005)
(I.C.

5 40-208 contains standard of review for challenges of Commissioners decisions).
Where opposing parties both move for summary judgment based on the same evidentiary
facts and on the same theories and issues, the parties effectively stipulate that there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657
(1982). Summary judg~nentis appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the case can be decided as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Moss v. MidAmerican Fire andMarine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298,302,647 P.2d 754,758 (1982). The
construction and application of a legislative act are pure questions of law as to which the
Supreme Court exercises free review. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902,
980 P.2d 566 (1999).

APPELLATE BRIEF

Roeder Holdings, LLC v. Board ofEqualization ofAda Counly, 136 Idaho 809,812,41 P.3d
237,240 (2001).
1. The District Court erred in granting Defendants summary judgment and attorney fees

and costs and denying Plaintiffs partial summary, as Plaintiffs have a valid claim under 5

1983 (see Addendum, at xvi) with damages to he determined. In Monell v. Dept ofSoc. Svc.s.
ofN Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-700 (1978) the US Supreme Court stated that a governmental entity is
liable for its actions under its policies or customs.
The undisputed evidence in this case finds Defendants acting and failing to act under the
color of state law in its activities on CCR. The matters of the issuance of the first Wagner
driveway access permit and the NLCHD maintenance and improvement activities are under the
policieslcustoms of andlor the expressed approval ofthe final policy makers of the NLCHD (R.
Vol. IV, p. 632, L. 17-22 (Defendants' policies for maintenance and improvementjurisdictional claims-is

based on I.C.§40-2312); Tr., Vol. I, p. 120, L. 14-21 (Defendants

asserted that I.C.540-23 12 mandates a minimum width of public highways established by user is
50 feet except for those which had a lesser width in 1887); R. Vol. IV, p. 638, par. 10 (Defendant
Payne states that there are special circumstances in which I.C.§40-2312 is not the basis for the
District's public road and maintenance activities-"suc11

as when the District has been deeded a

public right of way of less than fifty feet wide or when the inlprovement predated the
establishment of a public road"); R. Vol. VI, p. 1210, par. 3 (Defendant Payne states that there
are no special circumstances on CCR); Tr. Vol. I, p. 126, L. 9-16 (Defendants' maintenance

APPELLATE BRIEF

functions are a matter of right within a 50 foot right of way); R, Vol. VII, p. 1429 pars. 1 and 3
(the District's activities on CCR are based on Idaho law [I.C.§ 40-23 121)).
In sum, notwithstanding Defendants' own policy statements negate their legal policy
thesis-that
wide-as

I.C.540-2312 "mandates" the minimum width of public highways to be 50 feet
special circumstances exist, such as highways presently existing at a lesser width-a

deeded right of way of less than fifty feet is not required to meet the 50 foot standard;
Defendants also testify that CCR fails to fulfill their cornerstone prerequisite-that

CCR is a

legally established "public" highwaylroad. As was previously stated Defendants deny that any
official public dedication has ever taken place. Further, Chairman Arneberg , under oath,
confirms the claimed legal status of CCR-that

CCR is a public road, established by

prescription, 50 feet-25 feet from centerline wide (R. Vol. IV, p. 861, Response to Second
Interrogatories No. 4). Chairman Arneberg denies that a prescriptive right of waylhighway could
be less than 50 feet wide (R. Vol. IV, p. 885, Response to Request for Admission No. 5).
Defendants did not express a rational basis of a legitimate governmental interest to
require that Plaintiffs or abutting landowners to a prescriptive clainl of a lesser width than 50 feet
must sustain a greater burden on the servient estate than those abutting and deeding a right of
way to the county. Furthermore, their "right of way" claim was a result not oE user acquisiiio~i
but was necessitated by the lnaintenance and improvement requirements of the NLCHD (R. Vol.
IV, p. 637, par. 6 (in 2005-06 the NLCHD widened CCR for increased vehicular traffic and road
safety)). Clearly, the envelopment of Plaintiffs' land was for a public benefit and not as a
regulated harm to the public resultant from Plaintiffs' use oftheir land.
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Both the agency record and the record initially made in District Court show Plaintiffs
sought and were denied exhaustion of agency remedies under I.C.@40-203a and 67-8003(3) (R.,
Vol. V, pp. 828-837 (Plaintiffs Regulatory Takings filings)), as well as pre-(R., Vol. V, p. 842
(the 4/12/06 NLCHD meeting)) and post- (R., Vol. V, pp. 816-17 (the 3/21/07 NLCHD
meeting); R., Vol. V, pp. 819-824 (the 9/12/07 NLCHD meeting)) deprivational hearings.
Tlie overriding issues in this case are Plaintiffs' challenges of Defendants' decisions,
inferences, findings, and conclusions to physically invade and to allow third parties to physically
invade Plaintiffs' land and Defendants' failures to apply and/or to correctly apply statutes with
provisioiis of constitutional guarantees and remedies for erroneous deprivations In Mavesh v
State ofIdaho, Dept of Health and Welfave, 132 Idaho221,970 P.2d 14 (1999) the Idaho
Supreme Court outlined a two step analysis to determine whether a person's 1 4 ' Amendment
~
coiistitutional guarantees have been violated. First decide whether the individual's threatened
interest is a liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 226, 970 P.3d, at
19. And after a court finds a liberty or property interest will it reach the next step ofaiialysis, in
which it determines what process is due. I d , at 226,970 P.3d, at 19. At cross summary
judgment, Plaintiffs asserted that governmental action is required to legally establish public
rights in CCR. Plai~itiffsasserted that Defendants perjurious affidavits and claims are at best
arbitrary and capricious-without

any evidence in their records to support their findings,

conclusions, decisions, actions a i d failures to act (Tr. Vol. I, stating at p. 103, L.21 through p
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A. T h e District Court erred when it concluded that Plaintiffs did not have property rights

protected by the 14"' Amendment; C C R does not have a 50 foot width as mandated by law.
Property rights are created or given by state law. Board o f Regenls ofstate Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, at 577 (1972). Plaintiffs' deed, instrument No. 42441 1 (R, Vol. VI, p. 11501151), Latah County, Idaho, provides substantial evidence for the factual finding to support the
conclusion that Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected right created by state laws.
Defendants agree that Plaintiffs' land and property are constitutionally protected (Tr. Vol. I,
p.142, L. 16 and 17). In Idaho, real property includes land, possessor's rights to land, ditch and
water rights, mining claims (lode and placer), and free standing timber. See 1.C §§55-101, and
63-108. In Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,293-296,328 P.2d 397,400-402 (1958) the Idaho
Supreme Court held that private property of all classifications is protected under the Idaho
Constitution just co~iipensatioliclause. Plaintiffs' deed description gives Plaintiffs fee title to all
lands in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM except for the 3+1- acre parcel with its NE
boundary being the centerline of CCR. Plaintiffs have a lawful fence. See I.C. Title 35.
Defendants' legal jurisdiction is a strip of land, an easement, and Plaintiffs' ownership
rights extend to this easement as well. See Meservey v. Gulltford, 14 Idaho 133, 137,93 P. 780,
783 (1908) (The legal title to said land remains in the owner of the adjoining land or the land
over which the road runs). The District Court erred when it reduced Plaintiffs' due process claim
to a tautology. IfI.C.§ 40-2312 mandates a 50 foot prescriptive "right of way" for CCR it must
contain appropriate procedural constitutional safeguards. See Cleveland Brd Of Ed. F
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("'While the legislature may elect not to confer a property
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interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an
interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.' Citing Arnett v. Kennedy, at
416 U . S. 167). Defendants' ad hoc policy/custom interpretations of I.C.540-2312-that

a public

highway established by user has an adjudicated minimum 50 foot width mandated by Idaho
law-are

illvalid at their inception. I.C.540-23 12 does not adjudicate public rights to a 50 foot

width to a highway presently existing at a lesser width, whether the highway is public,
established by user, dedicated at a lesser width, or otherwise. It has no appropriate,
coiistitutionally adequate, procedural safeguards to do so. Further, I.C.540-2312 (see Addendum,
at xix) does not mention the word "public" (see I.C.540-117, at Addendum, p. iii). The District
Court abused its discretion by seeking an unconstitutional construction when the plain meaning
was not ambiguous. An appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that
upholds its constitutio~iality.See American Falls Reservoir Disl. No. 2, v. Idaho Dep 't of Water

Resources, 143 Idaho 862, at 869, 154 P.3d 433, at 440 (2007). Where the statutory language is
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no
occasion for the District Court to consider the rules of statutory construction. See Payette River

Properly Owners Ass'n v. Bd ofCounty Comm'rs, 132 Idaho 551,557,976 P.2d 477,383
(1 999). Plaintiffs' have substantial ownership rights in the lands underlying and abutting to
CCR, and their fence and these are protected by the 14~''Amendment.

B. Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of their property protected by the 141hAmendment.
The highway district has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
public rights were established in its entire claim. See ACHD v. TSI, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 365-
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66, 179 P.3d 323, 328-29 (2008) citing Floyd, 137 Idaho at 724,52 P.3d at 869. The legal
establislment of the public rights in the easement and Plaintiffs' protected property rights are
inextricably intertwined. An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific
purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. See Hodgins

v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225,229,76 P.3d 969,973 (2003). The use of the "surface of the roadway"
by the users of the road, whether the users are public or private, has not interfered with Plaintiffs'
use of their land for a buffer to protect their fence, to permit reasonable snow storage, to grow
trees and raise livestock until the late fall of 2005, if at all then. However, since that time the
Defendants have invaded and pernlitted third parties to invade Plaintiffs' land (Tr., Vol. I, p. 105,
from L. 18 though p. 106, L. 15). It is the Defendants' exertion of their governmental authority
at which Plaintiffs' Complaint is directed.
The con~missionersof a highway district have exclusive general supervision and
jurisdiction over all highways and public-rights-of-way within their highway system. See Idaho
Code 3 40-13 10(1) (Addendum, at p. xvi). Defendants have 1x0 jurisdiction beyond the extent of
the easement and have no authority to regulate Plaintiffs' use of their land. The power to
establish highways rests in the State legislature and the exertion of governmental authority in
laying out a highway is only valid as legislature provides. See Gooding Hwy.Dist. v. Idaho
Irrigation Co., 30 Idaho 232, 236-37, 164 P 99, I00 (1917). The requirements for determining if
a highway exists and what lands are within the Defendants' highway system are set forth in I.C.

3 40-202 (see Addendum, at p. iv).

I. C. 3 40-202(3) states that there are specific ways in which

a public highway may be created and provides in part:

APPELLATE BRIEF

Highways laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) of this
section [by acquiring real property and then adopting a resolution establishing as interest
in the property as a highway], by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways
used for a period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at
the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of coininissioners,
are highways.
Homestead firms, Inc., at 860,110P.3d 630, 635. As has been stated no "right of way", 50 foot
wide, 25 feet from centerline wide, or otherwise has been laid out or located and recorded by
orders of the coinmissioners on CCR. Thus any highway which exists across Plaintiffs' land is
limited to what land has been used for a period of five years and kept up at the public expensethe "surface of the roadway", the slope of CCR. These procedures are well established and
reasonably understood. See Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513, 518-519,373 P.2d 929,932 (1962), citing

Ross v. Swearingen, 39 Idaho 35,225 P. 1021 (Appellants had the burden of establishing the
existence of the public road described in the petition to prove that the road had been laid out and
recorded as a highway by order of the board of cornmissioners, or that it had been used as such
for a period of five years). An easement by prescription requires a showing by claimant of the
line of travel without material change or variation. See Roberts v. Swim, 1 17 Idaho 9, 15, 784
P.2d 339, 345 (Ct. App. 1989). The undisputed material facts-that

material changes in the

location and width of the "surface of the roadway" of CCR have occurred within the last five
years-provide

substantial evidence in the District Court record to support a finding and a

conclusion that Defendants have enveloped more of Plaintiffs' land as Defendants have not
legally acquired a "right of way" for their n~ailitenanceand improvement activities.
A judgment determining the existence of an easement must also specify the character,
width, length, and location. See Schneider 1). Nowe, 142 Idaho 767,774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239

APPELLATE BRIEF

(2006). The disputed evidence in this case amounts not to whether there is a 50 foot-25 feet
from centerli~~e
"right of way" but rather what is the legal width and location of the "surface of
the roadwaym-where does the identical strip of land used and maintained for five years lie? See

ACHD, at 365-66,179 P.3d 323,328-29 (citing Aztec, Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Investment Co., 100
Idaho 566,602 P.2d 64 (1979) (the case was decided on the failure to meet the requirement to
show use for five years). Defendants acknowledge the alterations in the surface of the road and
also aclmowledge the inadequacies of their procedures to fulfill constitutional guarantees (Tr.,
Vol. I, pp. 133, L. 21-25; 134, L. 1-9 (Defendants acknowledge that they have altered the CCR
centerli~leand cannot even by survey, after the fact, ascertain the accurate location of CCR).
The District Court erred when it ruled that CCR could be accurately located by a
moveable-fixed

centerline. Defendants' counsel changed and/or misstated (Tr. Vol. I, p. 121,

L. 19-21) the evidence that the centerline of CCR is the

now as it was in 1974~.Plaintiffs

hotly dispute this conclusion and Defendants do not dispute the alterations in the centerline (Tr.
Vol. I, p. 133, L. 21-23). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 121, L. 15-21) and the statement that the centerline or the
width of CCR is the same now as in 1974 is unsubstantiated by any evidence in the agency or
District Court record.

Defendants' counsel tries to paint a picture that CCR over the years has been altered
sy~nmetricallywhen in fact it hasn't. There are no public or agency records that CCR occupies
the identical strip of land it did prior to the 1996 alteration or the 2005-2006 alterations or any
alterations since. Defendants' counsel misstates the record. CCR rests on a steep canyon wall
with a large rock outcropping on the SE (Wagner) side of the road. This large rock outcropping,
the reason for the 1996 realignment of CCR, was blasted with little success in 2006 and remains
as an obstacle for widening CCR symmetrically even if Defendants had a 50 foot right of way to
do so (R., Vol. IV, p.637, par. 6; and R., Vol. VI, pp. 1210-11, pars. 4 and 5).
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Further, the Defendants were improperly augmenting the public record with their claims
of measurements (R., Vol. IV, pp. 637-38, pars. 5,6,7, 11 and 12; R., Vol. VI, pp. 1210, pars. 3,
4, and 5) being made to accurately describe the 1996 alterations and the placement of additional
width to the "surface of the roadway" in 2005 and 2006 as there was no such agency record of an
accurate description of the lands as is required for any of the Defendants' alterations. See Idaho
Historic Preservation Council, Inc, at 654, 8 P.3d 646, at 649 (when a governing body sits in a
quasi-judicial capacity it must confine its decision to the record produced at the public hearing
and failing to do so violates procedural due process of law). Defendants have duty to produce
record of highway alterations. See I.C.§§40-604(1), (2) and (4), at Addendum, p. xiv and 608 at
Addendum, p. xvi. In sum, the Defendants' unlawful intrusions into Plaintiffs' land under their
policies for maintenance and improvement has not only deprived Plaintiffs of their substantial
property rights, but has also put a valuable public asset, the "surface of the roadway" of CCR at
risk and expense of a lawsuit. The centerline of CCR forms the NE boundary between Plaintiffs
and the Wagners. Defendants' failure to lay out, describe, and record in 1996 and since the late
fall of 2005 has prejudiced both Plaintiffs' and the neighbors' property rights.
C. Defendants have violated Plaintiffs procedural and substantive due process and equal

protection rights. Plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process is constitutionally guaranteed as a
significant property right is at stake, and is not denied as a matter of tort claim notice or
regardless of the outcome of the factual determination of the width, location, use, or character of
the easement. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,266-267 (1978). The right to due process is
"absolute". Id. The denial of due process is actionable without proof of actual injury. Id.
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Plaintiffs assert that their property riglxts have bee11prejudiced as Defendants decisions,
conclusions, actions and/or failures to act are in violation of andlor are in excess of statutory
and/or constitutional provisions; are arbitrary and capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion; are clearly erroneous based on the undisputed and disputed facts and/or the agency
record; are effected by errors of law; and/or have been made upon uniawful procednre. Plaintiffs
assert that Defendants have failed to circumscribe their broad authorities with statutory
provisions and safeguards of constitutional guarantees and remedies for erroneous deprivations;
The District Court erred in its conclusion that Plaintiffs were not denied due process when
alterations in the easement were made (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1466-1472, pars. A.4. through B.1, 2,
and 3).

Invasions of Plaintiffs' land are final when they occur. See Sinaloa Lake Owners

Association v. City ojSimi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1402 (1988) (Williamson County's final
decision requirement is inapplicable in cases of physical invasion; a physical invasion is by
definition a final decision). Invasions by third parties are particularly egregious. See Loretto v.

Teleprompter Manhattan,, CATVCorp., 458 U.S. 419,435-38 (1982). Physical takings are not
determined by their size. See The City ofCoeur D' Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 847, 136
P.3d 3 10, 3 18 footnote n. 5 ("The regulatory takings tests, expressed in Loretto (regulation
approving of physical invasion, however minute, is a taking")). Absence of due process andlor
not "for public use" are substantive violations. See Lingle v. Chevron, USA Inc., 544 U . S . 528,
543 (2005) (" if a governlnent action is found to be i~nperrnissible- for instance because it fails
to meet the "public use" requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process - that is the end
of the inquiry. No amount of cornpensation can authorize such action"). Predeprivation due
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process is due in substantive due process violations and in procedural due process violations
when the violati011 is not unauthorized, foreseeable and predictable. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 1 13, 124-139 (1990) (predeprivational hearing is required when action is not unauthorized,
foreseeable and predictable). See also Zimmerman v. Cily ofOakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737-739
(9"' Cir. 2001). Post deprivatioual due process, while may be adequate in some cases, exhaustion
of agency remedies is not required. See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents 457 U.S. 496, 501
(1982) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a perquisite for seeking action under 5
1983). See Zinermon, at 124-125 (exhaustion ofjudicial remedies is not required under 5 1983).
The matter of tort claim notice is not material in the issues and remedies available: Idaho Tort
Claims Act does not cover the matters of trespass, nuisance, inverse condemnation and 42 USC

5

1983 makes no requirement of a tort claim notice. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138-146
(1 988). Further any time bar of Plaintiffs' actions "accrues after the full extent of the
impairment of the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of [the property] becomes apparent". See The
City of Coeur D ' Alene, at 846, 136 P.3d 310,3 17 citing Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho

667,671,603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (quoting Aaron v. Unitedstates, 31 1 F.2d 798,802 (Ct.CI.
1963)). The Defendants have no immunity for violations of the statutes or the Constitution. See
Owen v. City ofindependence, 445 U.S. 622,635-640 (1980). Plaintiffs have a right to

challenge the final decisions, inferences, conclusions, and findings of the Defendants when they
adversely affect Plaintiffs' property rights and a right to appeal the District Court's rulings while
acting in an appellate role. See I.A.R.Rule (I l)(f). See Homestead, supra, at 858, 119 P.3d 630,
633-634). Further, successful claims of a "class of one" are brought about by intentional
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arbitrary difference in treatment without a rational basis whether by expressed terms of statute or
improper execution by officials. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech 528 1.l.S. 562, 564 (2000)
See also The CityofCoeur d2lene at 853, 136 P.3d 310, 324.
It is well established law in Idaho that alterations in width andlor location of an easement
not only increases the burden on the servient estate, but also have the effect of enveloping more
land. See Argosy Trusl Through Its Trustee, Alan Andrews v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, at 573,
114 P.3d 128, at 13 1, (2005) (citing Aztec Lfd., Ind. V. Creekside Investment Co., 100 Idalio 566,
569,602 P.2d 64,67 (1 979), ("An increase in width does more than merely increase the burden
upon the servient estate; it has the effect of enveloping additional land"). The Supreme Court
says the saine argument goes for alteration of location of the easement. See Bruce Byron Bedke
v. Pickelf Ranch Aridsheep Co., an Idaho Corporation, 143 Idaho 36,39, 137 P.3d 423,426

(2006) (citing Argosy Trust ex reel. Ils Truslee and Aztec Ltd, Inc. (the same is true with respect
to the change in the location of an easement; it has the effect of enveloping more land).
Defendants knew or should have known that the alterations of the width andlor location of the
"surface of the roadway" of CCR would envelop more of Plaintiffs' land.
It is also well established law in Idalio that adverse use is one of the five elements
necessary to establish a prescriptive easement. See Hodghs, at 231,76 P.3d 969, at 975. The
Idaho Supreme Court has characterized "adverse use", as an actual invasion or infringement
made without permission of the owner. Id. Adverse use, hostile use and/or under a claim of
right are synonymous. Id. Such adverse use by the Defendants is expressly prohibited by the US
Constitution 5thand 14thAmendments and the Idaho State Constitution, Article I $3 13 and 14.
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Plaintiffs have not argued that Defendants cannot acquire Plaintiffs' land; they have
asserted that Defendants carnot take their land without due process. Plaintiffs argue that the
Defendants have no authority to create a prescriptive "right of way" and Defendants' claims are
made upon unlawful procedure andlor affected by other errors of law. The Idaho State
legislature has provided Defendants with authorizing statutes for altering CCR-such

as I.C.jj§

40-13 10 (see Addendum p. xvi) or 605 (see Addendum, p. xv)--containing procedural safeguards
of Plaintiffs' constitutional guarantees to obtain and fix a strip of land, a "right of way", for their
maintenance and improve~nentactivities that is not based on an oxymoronic fixedlvariable claim.
The District Court acknowledged that the authorizing statute for widening a highway falls under
I.C.§§ 40-605 and 1310 (R. Vol. IV, pp. 763-774, par. 2 (the District Court acknowledged that
the authority to alter a road falls under I.C.§§ 40-1310 or 605)).
Predeprivation procedural safeguards would have been of value in preventing the
deprivation of Plaintiffs' property. A deprivation of Plaintiffs' propelly rights is not
unpredictable when Defendants are planning to alter a road or when Plaintiffs attended the
4/12/06 NLCHD meeting which was also attended by all necessary parties (R., Vol. V, pp. 86466, (Chairman Arneberg's response to Interrogatory No. 12 indicating presence of the Wagners
at the 4/12/06 meeting); R., Vol. V, pp. 842 (Bob Wagner speaks at the meeting)). It is
foreseeable that alterations in the "surface of the roadway" and issuance of access permits across
Plaintiffs' land have an adverse effect on Plaintiffs' property rights. It is predictable that
deprivations of Plaintiffs' land will occur when Defendants issue driveway access permits
trespass on Plaintiffs' land and add width and alter the location of the easement. The Idaho
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legislature has given Defendants the broad authorities to alter CCR and to issue encroachment
permits. I'redeprivation due process is due when the violation is not unauthorized, foreseeable
and predictable.
Defendants have never given Plaintiffs notice that their fence was encroaching on the
right of way. See I.C.§§40-23 17 alid 23 19, at Addendum, p. xix (notice is required for
encroachment and fences). Defendants had opportunity to formalize their policies or give
Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to challenge their inferences, findings, or conclusions at a
meaningful time in a meaningful way. Defendant Payne stated that Plaintiffs' fence was within
their "right of way" (R., Vol. IV, p. 639, par. 12) and that the cause ofthe damage to Plaintiffs'
fence was that it was in the "right of way" (R., Vol. V, p. 859, Defendant Payne's response to
Interrogatory No. 28). Defendant Hansen states that property line issues have nothing to do with
the NLCI4D (R., Vol. V, p.817, L. 5-6) and that there is an existing road with a 50 foot right of
way (R., Vol. V, p.817, L. 15-16). The Defendants made legal conclusions and applied general
laws to Plaintiffs' specific situation. See Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc., at 65 1 , 654,

8 P.3d 646, at 649 (2000) (the action is judicial if general laws are applied to specific individuals,
interests, or situations citing Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101
Idaho 407,614 P.2d 947 (1980) (quoting Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23,27
(Or, 1973))). The issuance of the first Wagner driveway access permit was unlawful-for

a

trespass. See The City of Coeur D' Alene at, 846, 136 P.3d 3 10, at 3 17 (a permit cannot be
issued for an unlawful act). Plaintiffs' property right lies in the fee of their land and not in the
Wagners' access permit or in Defendants' invalid interpretation of I.C.§40-23 12. Further, it was
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unlawful whether public rights have been legally established to 50 feet or not. The Highway
District does not have title in fee simple to the easement and even if it did the Defendants could
not convert Plaintiffs' land to a third party's use. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 507,65
P.3d 525, 529 (2003) (even a deeded easement does not give the public the same right to sell or
dispose of the same that a private party has to land for which he holds the title in fee simple
(citing Idaho Code 5 55-309 (2002))).
Plaintiffs sought agency remedy to resolve the issues and the continued onslaughts on
their buffer and fence. Although not required to do so under § 1983, it is sometimes held that
where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the
administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act. See American Falls
Reservoir Dist. No. 2, at 869, 154 P.3d 433, at 440. Plaintiffs had right to remedy under the

statutory provisions of I.C.

$5 40-203a (see Addendum, at p. x)-requesting

validation of CCR

initiated under the commissiollers own resolution6-and under 67-8003(3) (see Addendum, at p.
xxi) (R., Vol. V, pp. 828-837 (Plaintiffs' Requests for Regulatory Takings Analysis filings
seeking evaluation of the Defendants' administrative actions). Defendants misrepresented I.C.

55 40-203a as Plaintiffs'

obligation to pay a $750 fee and file a petition for validation (Tr. Vol. 1:

p. 20, L. 10-17; p. 21, L. 13-22); (R., Vol. V, p. 820, beginning at L. 38 through p. 822, Line 13

'Plaintiffs presented evidence to the Defendants on 3/21/07 and requested that the
Commissioners validate CCR under their own resolution (R. Vol. V, p. 806, Plaintiffs' letter to
the Commissioners prior to the requested time of the agenda ("Whether this can be addressed by
a process of deeded easement, highway validation, eminent domain or some other process, we
submit it for your consideration")) to determine the legal establishment of the easement (R. Vol.
V, pp. 806-814; pp. 816-817 (minutes of NLCHD meeting on 3/21/07).
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and p. 823, L. 20 through L. 33) and as a predeprivation process (R. Vol. IV, p. 632, L. 9-15
("...Idaho Code 5 40-203 A provides a predeprivation process.. .")). Defendants' counsel
misrepresented 1.C.Q:67-8003(3) as not pertaining to the issues (R. Vol. V, p. 821, L. 20
(Landeck says the filings do not relate to the proceedings). On 9/12/07 Defendants indicated a
final decision that they were not going to allow exhaustion of the remedies and gave Plaintiffs
the choice to pay a $750 fee for a hearing or to get a lawyer (R., Vol. V, p. 823, L. 31-33
(Landeck said the Halvorsons' first step should be to hire a lawyer; Sherman Clyde said Mr
Halvorsoll should just hire a lawyer). These issues were brought up in District Court7 as
Plaintiffs initially sought declaratory reliefunder I.C. 5s 40-203a and 67-8003(3). Plaintiffs
asserted that they had a right to private action-they
their protected property rights-not

a public one-was

were asking a private question, violation of
the road "public" or private? See Dopp v

Idaho Commission ofpardons and Parole, 144 Idaho 402,406-407, 162 P.3d 781,785-86

(Ct.App. 2007) (Court of Appeals indicates when a person, as a member of the class of persons
the law was enacted to protect may seek action for violations of the statute to assure
effectiveness of the statute). Defendants claimed CCR was a "public highway", 50 feet-25

feet

from centerline wide Plaintiffs sought validation of the legally established public rights in the
road. The statutels, I.C$$ 40-203a, 208, and 67-8003(3) were for Plaintiffs benefit. Plaintiffs
had a vested right in the statutes. Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants had a duty to validate the
easement under their own resolution (I. C.5 40-203a) to substantiate their claims andlor to
R. Vol. I, pp. 176-224 (Plaintiffs' I.C. $40-203a motion, affidavit and brief for declaratory
judgment); R. Vol. I, pp. 68-164 (Plaintiffs' I.C. $ 67-8003(3) lnotion and brief for declaratory
judgment); R., Vol. 11, pp. 262-293 (Plaintiffs' motion and brief for reconsideration).
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evaluate the issues under I.C.3 67-8003(3). Defendants' defense of no final decision was
frivolous. Payment of the $750 fee requirement is inappropriate as it just adds additional injury
to Plaintiffs and initiation under the Commissioners' resolutioil is required by law. See Havvis
v. County ofRivevside, 904 F.2d 497 at 501-503 (plaintiff was required to pay a fee to regain the
use of his land of which he had already been deprived of was a concrete injury in and of itself).
Plaintiffs asserted that declaratory judgment under 1.C.S 40-203a was proper as Plaintiffs'
motion was not advisory; as Plaintiffs' Complaint and motion were justiciable. See Musk~atv.
UnitedStates, 219 U.S. 346, 359-363 (191 1). Plaintiffs were seeking validation of the legal
establishment of CCR, not the coi~stitutionalityof I.C.5 40-2312. There was no multiplicity of
cases in the present case. See Scott v. Agricultural Products Corp, Inc., 102 Idaho 147, 149,627
P.2d 326, 328 (1981). Plaintiffs filed for declaratory relief under their civil case-two

separate

cases did not exist. The District Court abused its discretion to deny declaratory relief on I.C.3
40-203a and/or on I.C.5 67-8003(3) on the basis ofjudicial economy as the prolonging of the
litigation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 48 beginning at L. 19 through p. 50, L. 20 (Defendants' counsel argues
an evidentiary hearing is necessary)) andlor search for the facts was unwarranted and as
Plaintiffs sought Defendants' liability for due process violations for alleged per se takings. If
there was not doubt to the legality of the claimed established rights Defendants could have
brouglt forth motion for summary judgment then and not a year later. If there was doubt, the
District Court could have remanded the validation back to the agency. Both matters were
reviewable as a matter of agency record under I.C. § 40-208 and the IAPA and therefore
appealable as a matter of right under I.A.R. 1 I(f). See Homestead, at 858, 119 P.3d 630,633-
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634. Further Plaintiffs had the private right to assert statutory violations. The second prong of
Williamson Cnty Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-197 (1985) that Plaintiffs must
seek just compensation is inapplicable as just co~npensatioilimplies that due process was
afforded, whether properly done or not. See Lingle, supra. Neither party suggests that due
process was afforded, even inadequately (R., Vol. V, p. 821 (9112107 NLCHD meeting; Ron
Landeck says no proceeding has been before the commissioners). Defendants cannot silnply rule
by fiat under I.C.§40-23 12. Furthermore, without substantial evidence in their records to support
their findings, conclusions and decisions on the width, location, use, andlor character of the
"surface of the roadway" all Defendants' actioilslfailures to act are arbitrary and capricious,
illegal andlor an abuse of Defendants' discretion. See Enterprise, Inc, v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho
734, 536 P.2d 729 (1975) (an action is arbitrary if it was done without a rational basis; if it was
done in disregard of the facts and circninstances presented or without adequate determining
principles).
In Armstrong v. US., 364 U.S.40, at 49 (1960) the US Supreme Court held that the
legitimate governmental interest in a taking was to spread the burden to the public as a whole.
Defendant Payne expressed Defendants' reason for the CCR alterations since 2005 was for the
benefit of the public (R., Vol. IV, p. 637, par. 6 (widened the traveled surface for reasons to
improve road safety for increased vehicular travel); not a harmful Plaintiffs' use of their land.
The Defendants have offered no rational basis of a legitimate governmental interest to regulate or
have shown Plaintiffs' use of their land is unsafe, immoral, unhealthful, or causes a dinlinution
the public's general welfare. Defendants have no legal authority to conclude Plaintiffs' use of
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their land creates a nuisance. See I.C. 5 22-4504 (Addendum, at ii). Defendants' jurisdiction is
limited to highways and public rights of way (see 1.C. 5 40-1310 (1) (Addendum, at xvi). At best
Defendants' denial of the exhaustion of agency remedies shows deliberate indifference and
callous disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional-5"'

Amendment (Bill of Rights) as covered by the

14IhAmendment.
D. Defendants' claims to regulate the use of Plaintiffs' land as a "right of way" are not
supported by the undisputed facts nor do they have any legal merit. Defendants' and the
District Court's case law citations do not support such claims. Defendants' and the District
Court's theory that Mesevvey h d its progeny [Bentel v. Bannock County, 104 Idaho 130,656
P.2d 1383 (1983)l provide a rational basis for an unconstitutional expansion of the width or
alteration in the location of a prescriptive easement is without legal merit. See Argosy Trust
Through Its Trustee, Alan Andrews, at 573, 114 P.3d 128, at 131 (There is a difference between

the enlargement in the use permitted by the owner of the dominant estate and the enlargement of
the physical dimensions of the easement). In Bentel the Bentels, conceded the public rights in
tile "surface of the roadwayn-there

is no mention of a 50 foot "right of way". The Idaho

Supreme Court does not conflate use with width or location and held that the installation of
sewage disposal pipelines within an existing roadway does not expand the burden to the servient
estate a i d that such increased use could fill the entire prescriptive easement. The holdings of
Mesevvey do not suggest anything comparable to a conflated notion that the alterations in the

location and/or width are permissible expansions of the "uses" of an unrecorded prescriptive
easement. I11 Meservey the Idaho Supreme Court cited Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341,44
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Pac. 1032, with the contemplation of the question how the width of a public highway by
prescription is determined
[Tlhe width must be deterniined from a consideration of the facts and c~rciunstances
peculiar to the case, because in such event the court cannot say that any highway is of a
certain width "in the absence of statutory provisions.
Id, at 93 P.780,784 (1908). The Supreme Court clearly did not see thc predecessor to 2312 as
demanding a specified width for a prescriptive highway. The Idaho Supreme Court held in

Meservey that the road overseer could not enforce road encroachment statute for a prescriptive
right of way which had not been laid out and recorded, Id., at 146-147,93 P. 780,782-783
The ~ i s t ' r i cCourt
t
also failed to note the obvious differences of the present case with its
case citation of ACIfD. That case differs from the present case in several significant ways. In

ACHD. the disruptor of the status quo was the abutting landowner who built a fence in a part of
an existing alleyway which had been dedicated to the public in 1906 to which the users had
extended the width of to avoid misplaced power poles in 1957. This new usage by the public to
avoid the power poles was greater than five years in duration-the

users had acquired the land by

time and use. In the present case, the disruptors of the status quo, the Defendants, owe Plaintiffs
due process for lands not yet acquired by the users and not previously laid out and recorded
Further the District Court failed to comprehend that District of Colunzbia v. Robinson,
180 U.S. 928. follows the same well established implied course as I.C.5 40-202(3) (R., Vol. IV,

District of Columbia and I.C. 5 40-202 follow the same plan: Harewood Road was a
prescriptive claim as it had not been laid out and recorded; therefore the width of the easement
equaled the width ofthe road and the determination of the width was a matter properly before the
jury as a matter of adverse use of the users; the Levy was denied its defense of "good faith for its
failure to survey. There are differences in the prescriptive period and the legislature required the
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pp. 766-67 (District Court suggests that the width of CCR is determined by something other than
(i) what has been laid out or located and recorded or (ii) been used and maintained for a given
period of time; and that something other is to be factually determined as in a prescriptive or
adverse use claim).

E. CCR has not been legally established as a "public" highway and Plaintiffs have a right
to challenge the truthfulness of Defendants' affidavits. Public status of a roadway can be
established by proof of regular maintenance and extensive public use. See ACIiD, at 365-66,179
P.3d 323, 328-29. Defendants are not permitted to validate public rights in a highway under
their own resolution except under certain circumstances. See Galvin v. Canyon County High.
Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 579,6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000) ("Section 40-203A may only be used to
validate an existing highway or public right of way about which there is some kind of doubt. It
does not allow for the creation of new public rights"). Placing CCR on the District's map does
not adjudicate public status in CCR. See Ifomestead, at 862, 119 P.3d 630, at 637 (Justice
Eislnann specially concurring, added that public rights are not legally established under I. C. §
40-202 and that evidence is required in the agency record to place a prescriptive highway on the
map). The legal "pu~blic"status of CCR is a legal conclusion based on factual findings of
substantial evidence in the agency record. See I.C.340-203a(2)(3) (Addendum, at x). In
summary judgment affidavits cannot be presented in bad faith-simply

to delay and harass. See

Levy to lay and record all highways in the District to determine the proper location and width;
whereas in Idaho the determination of the width is left to the discretion of the authorities in
charge of n~aintenance,and a statutory width may be acquired if the authorities choose to do so,
I.C. 40-605.
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I.R.C.P. Rule 56(g). See I;i.ank.s v. Delaiuave, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978) (right to challenge
the truthfulness of affidavits rests within the 14"' Amendment).
Defendants brought forth affidavits in bad faith indicating that CCR had been legally
established as a public road but brought forth no agency record to support their conclusory
statements. The Defendants under oath state that CCR is a public road (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1458,
beginning at L. 19 to p. 1459, L. 7 (District Court notes affidavits of Ameberg and Carscallen));
see also affidavits of Dan Payne (R., Vol. IV, p. 638, pars. 10 and 11 (describes CCR as a public
road); R., Voi. VI, p. 1210, par. 3 (describes CCR as a public road); see also Chairman
Arneberg's response to Plaintiffs' interrogatories to describe the legal establishment of CCR (R.,
Vol. V, p. 861, Interrogatory No. 4 (CCR is a public road, 50 feet-25 feet from centerline wide));
and Defendants' counsel at oral argument (Tr., p. 119, L. 5-8 (Defendants' counsel testifies that
Dan Payne states CCR has been a public road since 1974)). The District Court erred by failing
to ascertain that CCR was legally dedicated to the public and was properly put on the District's
map, by not reviewing the agency record. The District Court erred when it stated that CCR was
a "public" road based on Plaintiffs' failure to dispute it as it holds no value to the legal
establishment of CCR.
2. The District Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' interlocutory motions for partial
summary judgments on the basis that the width of CCR needed to be factually determined.

The District Court's denials of declaratory relief (R., Vol. 11, pp. 251-59; R., Vol. 11, pp. 307-12))
and/or relief as a matter of law (R., Vol. IV, pp. 763-72) were without legal merit as Plaintiffs
have a property right protected by the 14"' Amendment. The factual determination of the width
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of CCR is not dispositive of Plaintiffs' due process (procedural andlor substantive) andlor equal
protection claims as Defendants had not laid out or located and recorded CCR or a "right of
way" for CCR andlor CCR had not been officially dedicated as public. See Evers v. County of
Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The issue is whether the County may make a

deter~ninationthat those requirelnents have been met and enforce its co~lclusionthat the road is
public without giving Evers prior notice and an opportunity to present argulnent and evidence
that the road was her private property"). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,80-93 (1972)
(interest of chattels was sufficient for them to invoke procedural due process safeguards).

3. Defendants are estopped from asserting and disputing the same facts or evidence.
In Floyd v. Bd of Comm 'rs ofRonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,726,52 P.3d 863,871
(2002) the Idaho Supreme Court indicates that quasi estoppel prevents a party fiom asserting a
right, to the detriment of another party, which is inconsistent with a position previously taken.
Defendants are estopped from claiming a rational basis of the issuance of the first Wagner
driveway access permit based on the accuracy of the deed description of 699 feet of road
frontage and then denying the accuracy of the deed as being significant of movement of CCR in
the deed's description of the intersection points of the east and west p~opertylines of the 3+1acre parcel with CCR. The discrepancies (R, Vol. V, p. 807-812 (Plaintiffs' letter describing the
shift in the 3+/- acre parcel) between the deed disruption and the Rimrock Survey [and as
Amended] Vol. VI, pp. 1155 (survey)-1 156 (amended survey)) are significant-the

3+1- acre

parcel had lost 200 feet of road frontage and the parcel itself had geographically shifted 50 feet
to the north. Further Defendants are estopped from asserting that CCR is "a public highway" for
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benefit of their specious claim of a 50 foot right of way mandated for CCR and then denying that
CCR has ever been officially dedicated to the public interest for denying the permission given
for the 1996 alteratio~isto CCR by Ed Swanson. Further Defendants are estopped from claiming
prescriptive acquisition to lands that Plaintiffs were denied declaratory judgment on as being
unused-"no

final decision" and/or "advisoryn-implying

that they were regulating the use of

Plaintiffs' undeveloped land next to the "surface of the roadway".

4. Defendants have intentionally destroyed evidence of the legal location and width of CCR

and should be sanctioned for spoliation of the evidence. In Courtney v. Big "0" Tires, Inc.,
139 Idaho 821, 87 P 3d. 930 (2003) the Idaho Supreme Court explained the ramificatiolls of
intentional destruction of evidence. Thus, the doctrine of spoliation provides that when a party
with a duty to preserve evidence intentionally destroys it, an inference arises that the destroyed
evidence was unfavorable to that party. Id., at 824, 87 P 3d. 930, at 933. Spoliation is a rule of
evidence applicable at the discretion of the trial court. Id. CCR has been altered in location and
width in a i d since 2005. The Defendants have a duty of to purchase necessary right of way (see
I.C.3 40-604) (1)and (7) (Addendum, at p xiv)); a duty to ensure that no private property is taken
(see I.C.

5 40-605) (Addendum, at p xv)); a duty to accurate records of altering highways (I.C.4

40-608) (Addendum, at p xvi)); a duty to convey and record (I.C.5 40-2302) (Addendum, at p
xviii)); and a duty to maintain a valid jurisdiction (I.C.9513 I0 (Addendum, at p xvi)), and 203a
(Addendunz, at p x)) and the burden of proof that they are within their easement (I.C.4 40-202)
(Addendum, at p iv)). The centerline of the easement is the property line between the Wagners
and Plaintiffs. Trespass is an intentional tort. The question of intent here being a matter of
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reckless action or a high degree of probability of harnl-an

objective standard of constructive

knowledge as opposed to a subjective state of mind. The only evidence of an unrecorded
prescriptive easement is its "as is where is" precedent condition for 5 years. The District Court
erred by denying Plaintiffs' motion for spoliation of evidence.

5. Plaintiffs have a right to amend their complaint as the Defendants continued their

maintenance and improvement activity and repeatedly damaged Plaintiffs' fence every
time Plaintiffs repaired it. Without declaratory relief or relief as a matter of law Plaintiffs are
powerless to stop Defendants' continued invidious onslaughts on their property. The District
Court was aware of the continuation of Defendants' activities and made no assessments as to
deficiencies in Plaintiffs' Conzplaint save for the need to factually determine the width of the
easement-the

burden of proof which rested upon the Defendants. 1.R.C.P Rule 1 in part reads,

"These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding". In Foman v. Davi,s 371 U.S. 178, 181-182 (1962) the US
Supreme Court quoted Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, at 48, "The Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the
outcome, and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on
the n~erits."The leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. Id. Of course, the
grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but
outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an
exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the
Federal Rules. Id. Since filing of their Complaint the NLCHD has continued to advance its
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improvement activity and has underinined and damaged trees at the edge of the road and pushed
more rock into Plaintiffs' buffer and needlessly piled snow on the fence in the winter of 2008-09
The District Court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff leave to amend their complaint.

6. The District Court erred in granting Defendants attorney fees and costs. A final decision
or order of the district court on judicial review of an agency decision is appealable as a matter of
right. See I.A.R. Rule 1l(f). Plaintiffs sought agency remedy and were denied on a claim of a
public right of way of 50 feet. The District Court denied Plaintiffs declaratory relief in lieu of a
factual determination on the Defendants' claims of "no final decision" and on a determination
that Plaintiffs sought an advisory declaration of their rights. Defendants' counsel could have
easily asked the State's Attorney General for advice on how to interpret I.C.340-23 12. The
Constitution is intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories.

UnitedStates v.Dickinson, 33 1 U . S. 745, 748 (1947). Further, the right to be heard does not
depend upon an advance showing that one will surely prevail at the hearing", Fuenles, at 86
Defendants' denial of being the direct, legal, proximate, and substantial cause of the mess on
CCR and their denial that issuing tlie first Wagner driveway access permit was not within the
scope of their responsibility with the constructive knowledge that they had altered the road and
that they had not laid out and recorded a "right of way" completely under the auspices of the
NLCHD attorney is juxtaposed to Plaintiffs right to peacefully enjoy their land.
"[wlhere a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what
the govermnent is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."
Board of Reagents ofstate Colleges, at 574. Plaintiffs have taken no physical actions to protect
their property interests and have had to continually repair the repeated damages to their fence.
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Plaintiffs have relied on the prornises o f one o f the cornerstones o f U.S. Constitution,
unencumbered by the legitimate questions o f exigent circu~nstancesor balances o f strained
individual and social rights and have supported their claims at every step with legal authority.
Nothing in Plaintiffs' actions has been frivolous, even i f the appellate courts say I.C.5 40-2312
adjudicates a 50 foot public "right o f way". The matter has been reduced to a statutory question
and Plaintiffs maintain a right o f appeal. See Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc, v. Nash-Holmes, 169
F.3d 636,645 (9th Cir. 1999) (an action becomes frivolous, for purpose o f attorney fees award
under 5 1988, when the result appears obvious or the arguments are wholly without merit). See

Christiansburg Garment Co, v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,422 (1978) (a defendant can recover
attorney's fees i f the plaintiff violates the 5 1988 standard at any point during the litigation, not
just at its inception). Plaintiffs' loss at the summary judgment stage does not render Plaintiffs'
case per se frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation for the purpose o f attorney's fees
n
have a nominal case under 5 1983. See Carey, at
under 5 1988. Id. At a bare m i n i ~ n u ~Plaintiffs
266-267. Further the Defendants claims for attorney fees were exorbitant and there was no
indication that the Highway District had paid the fees the counsel had claimed. To properly
exercise its discretion on a request for attorney fees, a trial court must, at a minimum, consider the
twelve factors outlined in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). See Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Jones, 145
Idaho 106, 195 P.3d 795,798-99 (2007).
7. The District Court had no subject matter jurisdiction, in the alternative exceeded its
subject matter jurisdiction, to rule on Defendants' motion for summary judgment and
vacate the jury trial. Plaintiffs' right to a jury trial is inviolate. See Idaho Const. art I ,
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5 7.

See

ACHD, at 179 P.3d 323, 332 (citing I.R.C.P. 38(a)). As the question of subject matter
jurisdiction may be brought up at any time, Plaintiffs do so now and assert that the District Court
lacked sub.ject matter jurisdiction to hear Defendants' motion for suinlnary judgment without
reviewing the agency record for the fulfillment of the legal requirements of the Defendants'
jurisdictional claims. See Stale ofIdaho v Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372. 374-77, 195 P.3d 731,
733-36 (Crt. A p p 2008) (defense of subject matter jurisdiction is never waived; judgments in
lack of subject matter jurisdiction are void; judges are liable for danlages). Parties cannot
consent to the court's assunlption ofjurisdictio~tthrough conduct or acquiescence nor be
estopped from asserting its absence. Fairway Developmenl Co, v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho
121, 125, 804 P.2d 294, 298 (1990)). Failure to exhaust agency remedies triggers the District
Court's subject matter jurisdiction and it appears that the trigger is the importance and lack of
agency record on which to rule. The matters Plaintiffs sought resolution of are largely, if not
entirely, niatters of the agency's and the Defendants' specialized activities. See Owsley v. Idaho

Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 135, 106 P.3d 455, 461 (2005) (the district court does not
acquire subject matter jurisdictioll until all the administrative remedies have been exhausted).
See Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721,726, 100 P.3d 615,620 (October, 2004) citing

Fairway Dev. CO.V . Bannoclc County, 119 Idaho 121, at 125,804 P.2d 294, at 298 (1990) ("the
administrative remedy is as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief")). Further,
I.C.§40-208 restricts the review of the Defendants' jurisdiction to the agency record. The
District Court has no subject matter jurisdiction on which to rule on a record initially made in the
District Court and doing so also violates Plaintiffs due process rights as the agency record is the
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focal point of the Defendants' due process violations. See I d , at 725, I00 P.3d 615, at 619 ("the
focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some
new record made initially in the reviewing court", citing Canzpt [sic] v. Pitts, 41 1 U . S . 138, 142
(1973). The issues involved simply confirm the Idaho Supreme Court's concern with the agency
record, exhaustion of agency remedies, and the Court's subject matter jurisdiction and due
process concerns. See Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. at, 654 8 P.3d 646, 649 (failing
to confine its decision to record produced at the public hearing violates due process).
The Idaho Court addressed a similar case in Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 106
P.3d 419, (2005), citing Ware v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 98 Idaho 477, at 483 (1977). Here it
was not a matter of exhaustion, rather a factual difference. In Ware, as in the present case, the
plaintiffs sought to deal with the mechanics of the law and the defendants overtly misrepresented
it rendering exl~austionas a "futile and useless act". Id., at 97, 106 P.3d419, at 423. However
the factual diffirence exists, the result is the sane here as the implication of subject matter
jurisdiction is still absent.
Whether CCR is a "public highway", "established by user", with "a minimum 50 foot
width mandated by Idaho law" is a matter of the commissioners decisions under Idaho law
(I.C.§§ 40-13 10,605, and 202), is a matter of exhaustion of agency remedies (I.C.$§ 40-203a
and 67-8003(3)), or a matter of Plaintiffs' Complaint (property right under

5 1983); all are

logical subsets of the District Court's subject matter jurisdiction and all circumscribed by the
subset of the agency record. The subject matter of the Defendants' motion for summary
judgment lies outside of that circumscription. Defendants' assertion under I.C.§40-2312 as a
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request for summary judgment is silnply a veiled attempt to get in effect an "advisory"
declaratory ruling. The burden of proof of the validity of the legally established public rights in
CCR as well as the burden of proof that the court has subject matter jurisdiction rests with
Defendants as well as with the District Court.

CONCLUSION: Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment must fail. Public rights in
CCR are limited to the acq~iisitionof the users of the road to be established by a jury to a
standard of the preponderance of the evidence. The authorities in charge of maintenance and
i~nprovementhave unlawfully taken Plaintiffs' land. The limits of Defendants' jurisdiction
under I.C. $40-202 are well established a i d easily understood by a reasonable person.
Defendants have no rational basis of a legitimate governmental interest to deny Plaintiffs due
process andlor equal treatment of the law. Defendants' claim that 1.C.S 40-23 12 adjudicates
public rights to a 50 foot "right of way" witliout due process of law has no legal merit, or factual
foundation and is frivolous. The relief sought by Plaintiffs is as follows: (a) to reverse the
District Court's ruling granting summary judgment to the Defendants; (b) to enjoin the District
Court from denying Plaintiffs declaratory relief in all matters of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights
of due process and equal protection of the law (see 5 1983); (c) to grant partial summary
judgment to Plaintiffs under 42 USC $ 1983 as Defendants are liable for damages in their
individual and official capacities as to be determined by ajury; (d) to provide Plaintiffs with a
venue of fair and impartial tribunal if any remand to a lower court is necessary (e) to grant
Plaintiffs right to amend their complaint with additional damages and additional. allegations of
abuse of process by Defendants and Defendants' counsel; (f) to enjoin Defendants from

APPELLATE BRIEF

e~lforcingtheir invalid policieslcustoms actionslfailures to act resulting in the improper
interferences with Plaintiffs' propelty rights and/or an abutting la~idowner'sproperty rights; (g)
return of all Plaintiffs' land wrongfully taken andlor voiding of all actions resulting in the
invasions of Plaintiffs' land; (h) to award full common law and/or compensatory damages to be
determined to Plaintiffs for all damages to Plaintiffs' land and for the time that t.he Defendants
were in wrongful possession of Plaintiffs' land andlor Plailitiffs were without the peaceful
enjoyment of their land and without the right to restrict others from their land; and (i) to award
Plaintiffs any and all attorney fees and costs that have been incurred or shall he incurred in the
full settlement of this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITED, on this 29''' day of December, 2009
Don Halvorson, Pro Se
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 29''' day of December, 2009, I caused 2 true and correct
copies of this document to be served on RONALD J. LANDECIC, 693 Styner Avenue, Suite 9,
P.O. Box 9344, Moscow, ID 83843 by hand delivery
Don Halvorso~i,Pro Se
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
DON HALVORSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant
and
CHARLOTTE HALVORSON,
Plaintiff
v.

)

1
1
)

1

) Supreme Court Docket No. 36825-2009
) Latah County District Couid No. 2008-180

NORTH LATAH COUNTY HIGHWAY
DISTRICT; BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
FOR THE NORTH LATAH COUNTY
HIGHWAY DISTRICT; ORLAND
ARNEBERG, RICHARD HANSEN,
SHERMAN CLYDE, in their official
capacities and in their individual capacities;
DAN PAYNE, in his official
capacity and in his individual capacity,
Defendants-Respondents
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I.C. (i 22-4504.LOCAL ORDINANCES. No city, county, taxing district or other political
subdivision of this state shall adopt any ordinance or resolution that declares any agricultural
operation operated in accordance with generally recognized agricultural practices to be a
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nuisance nor shall any zoning ordinance that forces the closure of any such agricultural operation
be adopted. Zoning and nuisance ordinances shall not apply to agricultural operations that were
established outside the corporate limits of a inunicipality and then were incorporated into the
municipality by annexation. The county planning and zoning authority may adopt a nuisance
waiver procedure to be recorded with the county recorder or appropriate county recording
authority pursuant to residential divisions of property.
I.C.§40-109.DEFINITIONS -- H.(S)"Ilighways" mean roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out
or established for the public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. Highways shall include
necessary culverts, sluices, drains, ditches, waterways, embankments, retaining walls, bridges,
tunnels, grade separation structures, roadside improvements, adjacent lands or interests lawfully
acquired, pedestrian facilities, and any other structures, works or fixtures incidental to the
preservation or improvement of the highways. Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order
of a board of commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five (5) years, provided
they shall have been worlted and kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by
order of a board of commissioners, are highways.

I.C.§40-117.DEFINlTIONS -- P. (5)"Public highways" means all higl~waysopen to public use in
the state, whether maintained by the state or by any county, highway district, city, or other
political subdivision. (Also see "Highways," section 40-109, Idaho Code).
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(6)"Public right-of-way" means a right-of-way open to the public and under the jurisdiction of a
public highway agency, where the public highway agency has no obligation to construct or
maintain, but may expend funds for the maintenance of, said public right-wf-way or post traffic
signs for vehicular traffic on said public right-of-way. In addition, a public right-of-way includes
a right-of-way which was originally intended for development as a highway and was accepted on
behalf of the public by deed of purchase, fee simple title, authorized easement, eminent domain,
by plat, prescriptive use, or abandomnent of a highway pursuant to section 40-203, Idaho Code,
but shall not include federal land rights-of-way, as provided in section 40-204A, Idaho Code,
that resulted from the creation of a facility for the transmission of water. Public rights-of-way
shall not be considered improved highways for the apportionment of funds from the highway
distribution account.

I.C.840-202. DESIGNATION OF HIGHWAYS AND PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY. (1) The

initial selectio~lof the county highway system and highway district system may be accomplished
in the following manner:
(a) The board of county or highway district commissioners shall cause a map to be prepared
showing the general location of each highway and public right-of-way in their jurisdiction, and
the commissioners shall cause notice to be given of intention to adopt the map as the official map
of that system, and shall specify the time and place at which all interested persons may be heard.
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(b) After the hearing, the commissioners shall adopt the map, with any changes or revisions
considered by them to be advisable in the publicinterest, as the official map of the respective
highway system.

(2) If a county or highway district acquires an interest in real property for highway or public
right-of-way purposes, the respective colnrnissioners shall:
(a) Cause any order or resolution enacted, and deed or other document establishing an interest
in the property for their highway system purposes to be recorded in the county records; or
(b) Cause the official map of the county or highway district system to be amended as affected
by the acceptance of the highway or public right-of-way.
Provided, however, a county with highway jurisdiction or highway district may hold title to an
interest in real property for public right-of-way purposes without incurring an obligation to
construct or maintain a highway within the right-of-way until the county or highway district
determines that the necessities of public travel justify opening a highway within the right-of-way.
The lack of an opening shall not constitute an abandonment, and mere use by the public shall not
constitute an opening of the public right-of-way.

(3) Highways laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2)of this section, by
order of a board of commissioners, and all highways used for a period of five (5) years, provided
they shall have been worked and lcept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by
order of a board of commissioners, are highways. If a highway created in accordance with the
provisions of this subsection is not opened as described in subsection (2) ofthis section, there
shall be no duty to maintain that highway, nor shall there be any liability for any injury or
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damage for failure to nlaintain it or any highway signs, until the highway is designated as a part
of the county or highway district system and opened to public travel as a highway.

(4) When a public right-of-way is created in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2)
of this section, or section 40-203 or 40-203A, Idaho Code, there shall be no duty to maintain that
public right-of-way, nor shall there be any liability for any injury or damage for failure to
maintain it or any highway signs.
(5) Nothing in this section shall limit the power of any board of comlnissioners to
subsequently include or exclude any highway or public right-of-way from the county or highway
district system.

(6) By July 1,2005, and every five (5) years thereafter, the board of county or highway
district commissioners shall have published in map form and made readily available a map
showing the general location of all public rights-of-way under its jurisdiction. Any board of
county or higllway district colnmissioners may be granted an extension of time with approval of
the legislature by adoption of a concurrent resolution.

(7) Nothing in this section or in any designation of the general location of a highway or public
right-of-way shall authorize the public highway agency to assert or claim rights superior to or in
conflict with any rights-of-way that resulted from the creation of a facility for the transmission of
water which existed before the designation of the location of a highway or public right-of-way.
I.C.940-203,ABANDONMENT

AND VACATION

OF COUNTY AND

HIGHWAY

DISTRICT SYSTEM HIGHWAYS OR PUBLIC RIGI-ITS-OF-WAY. (1) A board of county or
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highway district commissioners, whichever shall have jurisdiction of the highway system, shall
use the following procedure to abandon and vacate any highway or public right-of-way in the
county or highway district system including those which furnish public access to state and
federal public lands and waters:
(a) The commissioners may by resolution declare its intention to abandon and vacate any
highway or public right-of-way considered no longer to be in the public interest.
(b) Any resident, or property holder, within a county or highway district system including the
state of Idaho, any of its subdivisions, or my agency of the federal government may petition the
respective commissioners for abandonment and vacation of any highway or public right-of-way
within their highway system. The petitioner shall pay a reasonable fee as determined by the
commissioners to cover the cost of the proceedings.
(c) The commissioners shall establish a hearing date or dates on the proposed abandonment and
vacation.
(d) The commissioners shall prepare a public notice stating their intention to hold a public
hearing to consider the proposed abandonment and vacation of a highway or public right-of-way
which shall be made available to the public not later than thirty (30) days prior to any hearing
and mailed to any person requesting a copy not more than three (3) working days after any such
request.
(e) At least thirty (30) days prior to any hearing scheduled by the commissioners to consider
abandonment and vacation of any highway or public right-of-way, the commissioners shall mail
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notice by United States mail to lwown owners and operators of an underground facility, as
defined it1 section 55-2202, Idaho Code, that lies within the highway or public right-of-way.
(r) At least thirty (30) days prior to any hearing scheduled by the comlnissioners to consider

abandonment and vacation of any highway or public right-of-way, the commissioners shall Inail
notice to owners of record of land abutting the portion of the highway or public right-of-way
proposed to be abandoned and vacated at their addresses as shown on the county assessor's tax
rolls and shall publish notice of the hearing at least two (2) times if in a weeltly newspaper or
three (3) times if in a daily newspaper, the last notice to be published at least five (5) days and
not more than twenty-one (21) days before the hearing.
(g) At the hearing, the comlnissioners shall accept all information relating to the proceedings.
Any person, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of the federal
government, may appear and give testimony for or against abandonment.

(h) After completion of the proceedings and consideration of all related information, the
commissioners shall decide whether the abandonment and vacation of the highway or public
right-of-way is in the public interest of the highway jurisdiction affected by the abando~unentor
vacation. The decision whether or not to abandon and vacate the highway or public right-of-way
shall be written and shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(i) If the commissioners determine that a highway or public right-of-way parcel to be abandoned
and vacated in accordance with the provisions of this section has a fair market value of twentyfive hundred dollars ($2,500) or more, a charge may be imposed upon the acquiring entity, not in
excess of the fair market value of the parcel, as a condition of the abandonment and vacation;
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provided, however, no such charge shall be imposed on the landowner who originally dedicated
such parcel to the public for use as a highway or public right-of-way; and provided further, that if
the highway or public right-of-way was originally a federal land right-of-way, said highway or
public right-of-way shall revert to a federal land right-of-way.

6)The colnlnissioners shall cause any order or resolution to be recorded in the county records
and the official map of the highway system to be amended as affected by the abandonment and
vacation.

(k) From any such decision, a resident or property holder within the county or highway district
system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions or any agency of the federal
government, may appeal to the district court of the county in which the highway or public rightof-way is located pursuant to section 40-208, Idaho Code.
(2) No highway or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned and vacated so
as to leave any real property adjoining the highway or public right-of-way without access to an
established highway or public right-of-way.
(3) In the event of abandonment and vacation, rights-of-way or easenlents may be
reserved for the continued use of existing sewer, gas, water, or similar pipelines and
appurtenances, or other underground facilities as defined in section 55-2202, Idaho Code, for
ditches or canals and appurtenances, and for electric, telephone and similar lines and
appurtenances.
(4) A highway abandoned aud vacated under the provisions of this section may he
reclassified as a public right-of-way.
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(5) Until abandonment is authorized by the comn~issioners,public use of the highway or

public right-of-way may not be restricted or impeded by encroachnent or ir~stallationof any
obstruction restricting public use, or by the installatioi~of signs or notices that might tend to
restrict or prohibit public use. Any person violating the provisions of this subsection shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.

( 6 ) When a county or highway district desires the abandonment or vacation of any
highway, public street or public right-of-way which was accepted as part of a platted subdivision
said abandonment or vacation shall be accomplished pursuant to the provisions of chapter 13,
title 50, Idaho Code.

I.C.940-203a.VALIDATION OF COUNTY OR HIGHWAY DISTRICT SYSTEM I-IIGHWAY
OR PUBLIC RIGHT-OF-WAY.([) Any resident or property holder within a county or highway
district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of the
federal government, may petition the board of county or highway district commissioners,
whichever shall have jurisdiction of the highway system, to initiate public proceedings to
validate a highway or public right-of-way, including those which furnish public access to state
and federal public lands and waters, provided that the petitioner shall pay a reasonable fee as
determined by the cominissioners to cover the cost of the proceedings, or the com~nissionersmay
initiate validation proceedings on their own resolution, if any of the following conditions exist:
(a) If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal establishment or evidence of
establishment of a highway or public right-of-way;
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(b) If the location of the highway or public right-of-way cannot be accurately determined due to
numerous alterations of the highway or public right-of-way, a defective survey of the highway,
public right-of-way or adjacent property, or loss or destruction of the original survey of the
highways or public rights-of-way; or
(c) If the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used does not generally conform to the
location of a highway or public right-of-way described on the official highway system map or in
the public records.
(2) If proceedings for validation of a highway or public right-of-way are initiated, the
commissiollers shall follow the procedure set forth in sectio1140-203, Idaho Code, and shall:
(a) If the con~missionersdetermine it is necessary, cause the highway or public right-of-way to
be surveyed;
(b) Cause a report to be prepared, inciuding consideration of any survey a ~ l dany other
information required by the commissioners;
(c) Establish a hearing date on the proceedings for validation;
(d) Cause notice of the proceedings to be provided in the same manner as for abandonment and
vacation proceedings; and
(e) At the hearing, the commissioners shall consider all information relating to the proceedings
and shall accept testimony from persons having an interest in the proposed validation.

(3) Upon completion of the proceedings, the coln~nissionersshall determicle whether
validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public interest and shall enter an order
1

validating the highway or public right-of-way as public or declaring it not to be public.
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(4) From any such decision, any resident or properly holder within a county or highway
district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of the
federal government, may appeal to the district court of the county in which the highway or public
right-of-way is located pursuant to section 40-208, Idaho Code.
(5) When a board of commissioners validates a highway or public right-of-way, it shall
cause the order validating the highway or public right-of-way, and if surveyed, cause the survey
to be recorded in the county records and shall amend the official highway system map of the
respective county or highway district.

(6) The commissioners shall proceed to determine and provide just conlpensation for the
removal of any structure that, prior lo creation of the highway or public right-of-way, encroached
upon a highway or public right-of-way that is the subject of a validation proceeding, or if such is
not practical, the colnmissioners niay acquire property to alter the highway or public riglit-ofway being validated.
(7) This section does not apply to the validation of any highway, public street or public

right-of-way which is to be accepted as part of a platted subdivision pursuant to chapter 13, title
50, Idaho Code.
I.C.540-208.JUDICIAL REVIEW (1) Any resident or property holder within the county or
highway district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any agency of
the federal government, who is aggrieved by a final decision of a board of county or highway

APPELLANTS' BRIEF-ADDENDUM

xii

district conlmissioners ill an abandonment and vacation or validation proceeding is entitled to
judicial review under the provisions of this section.
(2) Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition in the district court of the county in
which the commissioners have jurisdiction over the highway or public right of way within
twenty-eight (28) days after the filing of the final decision of the commissioners or, if a rehearing
is requested, within twenty-eight (28) days after the decision thereon.
(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the commissioners' decision. The
reviewing court may order a stay upon appropriate terms.

(4) Within thirty (30) days after the service of the petition, or within further time allowed by the
court, the commissioners shall transmit to the reviewing court the original, or a certified copy, of
the entire record of the proceeding under review. By stipulation of all parties to the review
proceedings, the record may be shortened. A party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the
record may be ordered by the court to pay for additional costs. The court may require subsequent
corrections to the record and may also require or permit additions to the record.

(5) If, before the date set for hearing, application is made to the court for leave to present
additional information, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the additional
information is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceeding
before the conimissioners, the court may order that the additional information shall be presented
to the commissioners upon conditions deterlnined by the court. The commissioners may modify
their findings and decisions by reason of the additional information and shall file that
information and any modifications, new findings, or decisions with the reviewing court.
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( 6 ) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record.
In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the comn~issio~lers,
not shown in the record,
proof thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and
receive written briefs.

(7) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the conln~issionersas to the weight of
the information on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the co~nmissionersor
remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the cominissioners' findings,
inferences, coiiclusions or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners;
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) Affected by other error of law;
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial information on the whole
record; or

(0Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise
of discretion.

I.C.340-604 DUTIES AND POWERS OF COMMISSIONERS. Commissioners shall:
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(1) Exercise general supervisioll over all highways in the county highway system, including

their location, design, construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance, and develop general
policies regarding highway matters.

(2) Cause to be surveyed, viewed, laid out, recorded, opened and worked, any highways or
public rights-of-way as are necessary for public convenience under the provisions of sections 40202 and 40-203A, Idaho Code.
(3) Cause to be recorded all highways and public rights-of-way within their highway
system.. .

(7) Contract, purchase, or otherwise acquire the right-of-way over private property for the use
of county highways and for this purpose may institute proceedings under the code of civil
procedure.. .
[(13)](14) By July 1,2000, and every five (5) years thereafter, the co~n~nissioners
shall have
published in map form and made readily available the location of all public rights-of-way under
their jurisdiction. The commissioners of a district may be granted an extension of time with
approval of the legislature by adoption of a concurrent resolution.

I.C.§40-605 LAYING OUT OF NEW EIIGHWAYS-WIDENING,
STRAIGHTENING EXISTING HIGHWAYS-PURCHASE

CHANGING, OR

OF RIGHTS-OF-WAY BY

AGFGEMENT. Coinmissioners niay lay out new highways within the county as they deterinine
to be necessary. The right-of-way of any highway shall not be less than fifty (50) feet wide,
except in exceptional cases. Co~nmissionersmay also change the width or location or straighten
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lines of any highway under their jurisdiction. If, in the laying out, widening, changing or
straightening of any highway it shall becocne necessary to take private property, the
cornn~issionersor their director of highways shall cause a survey of the proposed highway to be
made, together with an accurate description of the lands required. The commissioners shall
endeavor to agree with each owner for the purchase of a right-of-way over his land included
within the description. If they are able to agree with the owner, the com~nissionersmay purchase
the land out of the county highway fund under their control, and the land shall then be conveyed
to the county for the use and purpose of highways.

I.C.340-608 RECORD OF HIGHWAY PROCEEDINGS. The clerk of the co~n~nissioners
shall keep a book in which must be recorded separately all proceedings of the commissioners
relative to each highway division, including orders laying out, altering, and opening highways;
and in a separate book a description of each highway division, its deputy directors of highways,
its highways, contracts, and all other lnatters pertaining to them.

I.C. 3 40-1310. POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIGI-IWAY DISTRICT COMMISSIONERS. (1)
The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive general supervision and jurisdiction
over all highways and public rights-of-way within their highway system, with full power to
construct, maintain, repair, acquire, purchase and improve all highways within their highway
system, whether directly or by their own agents and employees or by contract. Except as
otherwise provided in this chapter in respect to the highways within their highway system, a
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highway district shall have all of the powers and duties that would by law be vested in the
commissioners of the county and in the district directors of highways if the highway district had
not been organized. Where any highway within the limits of the highway district has been
designated as a state highway, then the board shall have exclusive supervision, jurisdiction and
control over the designation, location, maintenance, repair and reconstruction of it. The highway
district shall have power to manage and conduct the business and affairs of the district; establish
and post speed and other regulatory signs; make and execute all necessary contracts; have an
office and employ and appoint agents, attorneys, officers and employees as may be required, and
prescribe their duties and fix their compensation. Highway district commissioners and their
agents and employees have the right to enter upon any lands to make a survey, and may locate
the necessary works on the line of any highways on any land which may be deemed best for the
location.

(2) The highway district shall also have the right to acquire either by purchase, or other legal.
means, all lands and other property necessary for the construction, use, maintenance, repair and
improvement of highways in their system. The highway district may change the width or
location, or straighten lines of any highway in their system, and if in the constructing, laying out,
widening, changing, or straightening of any highways, it shall become necessary to take private
property, the district director of highways, with the consent and on order of the highway district
commissioners, shall cause a survey of the proposed highway to be made, together with an
accurate description of the lands required. He shall endeavor to agree with each owner of
properly for the purchase of a right-of-way over the lands included within the description. If the
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director is able to agree with the owner of the lands, the highway district co~n~nissioners
may
purchase the land and pay for it out of the funds of the highway district, and the lands purchased
shall the11 be conveyed to the highway district for the use and purpose of highways.
(3) Whenever the director of highways shall be unable to agree with any person for the purchase
of laud, or that person shall be unltnown or a nonresident of the county in which the highway
district is situated, or a minor, or an insane or incompetent person, the director shall have the
right, subject to the order of the highway district commissio~lers,to begin action in the name of
the highway district in the district court of the county in which the district is situated, to conde~nn
the land necessary for the right-of-way for the highway, under the provisions of chapter 7, title 7,
Idaho Code. An order of the highway district commissioners entered upon its minutes that the
land sought to be condemned is necessary for a public highway and public use shall be prima
facie evidence of the fact.

I.C.§40-2302 PUBLIC ACQUIRES FEE SIMPLE TITLE-RECORD

AND DEDICATION OF

I-IIGHWAYS. (1) By taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquires the fee simple
title to the property. The person or persons having jurisdiction of the highway may take or accept
lesser estate as they may deem requisite for their purposes.

(2) In all cases where consent to use the right-of-way for a highway is volu~itarilygiven,
purchased, or condemned and paid for, either an instrument in writing conveying the right-ofway and incidents to it, signed and acknowledged by the party making it, or a certified copy of
the decree of the court condemning it, must be made, filed and recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which the land conveyed or condemned shall be particularly described.
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(3) No highway dedicated by the owner to the public shall be deemed a public highway,
or bc under the use or control of a county or highway district unless the dedication shall be
accepted and confirn~edby the commissioners of tlic county or highway district.

I.C.$40-2312.WIDTH OF HIGHWAYS. All highways, except bridges and those located within
cities, shall be not iess than fifty (50) feet wide, except those of a lesser width presently existing,
and may be as wide as required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of the
authority in charge of the construction and maintenance. Bridges located outside incorporated
cities shall be the same width to and across the river, creek or stream as the highway leading to
it.

I.C.$40-2316. PRIVATE HIGHWAYS-ESTABLISHMENT.

Private highways may be opened

for the convenience of one or more residents of any county highway system or highway district
in the same manner as public highways are opened, whenever the appropriate comn~issioners
may order the highway to be opened. The person for whose benefit the highway is required shall
pay any damages awarded to landowners, and lteep the private highway in repair.

I.C.$40-2317.REMOVAL OF FENCES. When the alteration of an old or the opening of a new
highway lnaltes it necessary to remove fences on land given, purchased or condemned by order
of a court for highway purposes, notice to remove the fences shall be given by the director of
highways to the owner, his occupant, or agent, or by posting the notice on the fence. If removal
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is not accomplished within ten (10) days, or colnmenced and prosecuted as speedily as possible,
the director of highways may cause it to be carefully removed at the expense of the owner, and
recover from him the cost of removal. The fence material may be sold to satisfy the judgment.

I.C.540-2319.ENCROACI-IMENTS-REMOVAL-NOTTCNALTY FOR FAILURE TO
REMOVE-REMOVAL

BY COUNTY OR HIGHWAY DISTRICT-ABATEMENT.

(1) If

any highway or public right-of-way under tlie jurisdictioii of a county or highway district is
encroached upon by gates, fences, buildings, or otherwise, the appropriate county or highway
district may require the encroachment to be removed. If the encroachmellt is of a nature as to
effectually obstruct and prevent the use of the highway or public right-of-way for vehicles, the
coulity or highway district shall immediately cause the e~icroachmentto be removed.

- (2) Notice sliall be given to the occupant or owner of the land, or person causing or
owning the encroachment, or left at his place of residence if he resides in tlie highway
jurisdiction. If not, it shall be posted 01.1the encroachment, specifying the place and extent of the
encroachment, and requiring hiin to remove the encroachmelit within ten (10) days.

(3) If the encroachnent is not removed, or co~nmencedto be removed, prior to the
expiration of ten (10) days from tlie service or posting the notice, the person who caused, owns
or controls the encroachment shall forfeit up to one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for each day the
encroachment continues unremoved.

(4) If the encroachment is denied, and the owner, occupant, or person controlli~lgthe
encroachment, refuses either to remove it or to permit its removal, the county or highway district
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shall commence in the proper court an action to abate the encroachment as a nuisance. If the
county or highway district recovers judgment, it may, in addition to having the encroachment
abated, recover up to one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for every day the nuisance remained after
notice, as well as costs of the legal action and removal.
(5) If the encroachment is not denied, but is not removed within five (5) days after the
notice is complete, the county or highway district may remove it at the expense of the owner,
occupant, or person controlling the encroachment, and the county or highway district may
recover costs and expenses, as well as the sun1 of up to one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for each
day the encroachment remained after notice was complete.

I.C.367-8003 PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. (2)Upon the written request of an
owner of real property that is the subject of such action, such request being filed with the clerk or
the agency or entity undertaking the regulatory or administrative action not more than twentyeight (28) days after the final decision concerning the matter at issue, a state agency or local
governmental entity shall prepare a written taking analysis concerning the action. Any regulatory
taking analysis prepared hereto shall comply with the process set forth in this chapter, including
use of the checklist developed by the attorney general pursuant to subsection ( I ) of this section
and shall be provided to the real property owner no longer than forty-two (42) days after the date
of filing the request with the clerk or secretary of the agency whose action is questioned. A
regulatory taking analysis prepared pursuant to this section shall he considered public
information.
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(3) A governmental action is voidable if a written talting analysis is not prepared after a request
has been made pursuant to this chapter. A private real property owner, whose property is the
subject of governmental action, affected by a governmental action without the preparation of a
requested taking analysis as required by this section may seek judicial determination of the
validity of the gover~lmentalaction by initiating a declaratory judglnent action or other
appropriate legal procedure. A snit seelting to invalidate a governmental action for
~ l o ~ ~ c o ~ n p l with
i a l ~ csubsection
e
(2) of this section must be filed in a district court in the county in
which the private property owner's affected real property is located. If the affected property is
located in more than one (I) county, the private property owner may file suit in any county in
which the affected real propelty is located.

(4) During the preparation of the taking analysis, any time li~nitatio~l
relevant to the regulatory or
administrative actions shall be tolled. Such tolling shall cease when the talting analysis has been
provided to the property owner. Both the request for a taking analysis and the taking analysis
shall be part of the official record regarding the regulatory or administrative action.

42 U.S.C.

9 1983: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or iru~llunitiessecured by the Constitution and laws, shall bc
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
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such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.. .

U. S. Constitution Amend. V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be talcen for
public use, without just compensation.

U. S. Constitution Amend. XIV 9 1. Section 1. AIL persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jr~risdictioiithereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce ally law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, witliont
due process of law; nor deny to any person withirr its jurisdiction the equal protectioil of the laws.
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